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Roger N. Buckley
THE BRITISH ARMY'S AFRICAN
RECRUITMENT POLICY, 1790-1807:
Some Further Thoughts on
the Abolition Issue*
IN APRIL 1792, a motion for the gradual abolition of the British slave
trade was carried in the House of Commons by a vote of 238 to 85.
After much bitter debate, the crucial word "gradual" was interpreted to
mean the trade would come to an end on I January 1796. However,
Abolition was not achieved until some eleven years later in 1807.
What caused the abolition of the British trade to be delayed until
1807? And what was the role, if any, of William Pitt in this postpone-
ment?
The major work which focused on these and other questions was done
by the late Roger Anstey.! Anstey stressed, among other factors, a
number of political reasons for the long delay of abolition. He also
strove mightily to exonerate Pitt of any responsibility for the continua-
tion of the trade until 1807. Despite the general certainty and clarity that
pervades Anstey's probing analysis, he retreats before the enigmatic Pitt
and is forced to presume the reasons for Pitt's perplexing actions.~
New and substantial evidence, primarily in the form of P. R. O. War
Office and Colonial Office Papers, demonstrates that the successive
governments of Pitt and Henry Addington used the slave trade to
maintain a corps of black service troops and, more importantly, a
standing army of professional slave soldiers in the West Indies during
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The author will argue
in this paper that the British army's policy of purchasing thousands of
African slaves, directly from slaving interests, was an important reason
for the delay of Abolition until 1807. The author will also seek to explain
Pitt's perplexing political behavior vis-a.-vis the abolition debate (1796-
1806) in light of this new evidence.
* Presented as part of the Five College Black Studies Seminar Series. University of
Massachusetts at Amherst. 25 February J982.
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Britain had historically relied upon African slave labor to support its
military establishment in the West Indies. Africanization, or the critical
employment of Africans in virtually all branches of the British army in
the West Indies, was recognized during the Seven Years' War and the
American Revolution. 3 A corps of slave laborers, for instance, was
officially designated as the "King's Negroes," and units were attached to
each principal fortification in the British Caribbean by the 1770s. As
their name indicates, these men were the property of the British govern-
ment and were quartered in barracks set aside for their use.4 (It is
instructive to note that these Crown slaves were manumitted by a special
order from the British government in 1831.5) During peacetime their
aggregrate strength is not thought to have been more than approxi-
mately 1,000. (In addition to this contingent, several hundred privately
owned slaves were hired out to the army's quartermaster and engineer-
ing departments.)
Several conditions led to the British army's dependence on African
manpower in the West Indies by the end of the eighteenth century. These
included the absence of conscription, which severely limited the size of
the regular army, global wars which steadily increased the demand for
more and more troops, a pestilential climate, particularly for Euro-
peans, and, of course, the presence of a large, captive African
population.
The possibility of war with Spain around 1790 prompted the British
government to augment the number of black service troops in its Carib-
bean garrison. Earl Effingham, who arrived in Jamaica early in 1790 as
governor, received several "Secret" instructions in July and October,
1790, from Lord Grenville, then Home Secretary in Pitt's first adminis-
tration. These instructions authorized Effingham to strengthen the
defences of Jamaica by, among other things, purchasing as many slaves
as necessary on public account.6 As a consequence ofthe friendly turn of
events which resulted from talks with Spain and the unlikelihood of war,
Effingham was ordered to stop all military preparations.? It is not
known how many slaves had been purchased by Effingham during his
short term as governor of Jamaica; he died in November, 1791. A
subsequent report on the state of Jamaica's defenses indicated that in
March, 1793, eighty-seven black pioneers were attached to units of the
British army then serving in Jamaica. 8 To this number, however, must
be added an undetermined number of slaves similarly purchased and
employed at other British garrisons in the West Indies.
The timing of the British government's decision of 1790 to purchase
slaves on public account coincided with the first attack on the slave trade
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in England.9 At this time abolition was not a government measure
because Pitt's cabinet and his supporters in both houses were divided on
the issue. 10 However, as events proved, the British government would be
placed in a singularly embarrassing position when it subsequently used
the trade to purchase thousands of African slaves as recruits for the
West India Regiments. Perhaps this was anticipated by Grenville, which
may help to explain, at least in part, why he sent classified instructions to
Effingham.
There was renewed demand for slave-soldiers during the 1793-1815
war in the West Indies. The revolutionary tone during the early part of
the war between Britain and France, coupled with serious British mil-
itary setbacks and appalling casualties among European troops, com-
pelled the British government to rely heavily on blacks. This reliance
was both dramatic, because of the unprecedented numbers of Africans
involved, and sustained. In December, 1795, Jamaica claimed that
about 2,000 of its slaves were employed daily as pioneers. I I By Sep-
tember, 1797, the Windward and Leeward Island Command reported it
had raised a pioneer corps of 3,509 slaves. 12 All of these men, it is
thought, were eventually purchased on public account. However, the
largest contingent of purchased Africans were destined for service as
regular troops in some eight permanent regiments which were raised in
1795. These units were the so-called West India Regiments. They even-
tually constituted a standing, professional slave army in the British
Caribbean. 13 How many were purchased, by what means, and at what
cost?
According to the historian of the British army, Sir John Fortescue,
many British activities during the war in the West Indies were cloaked in
secrecy, making a complete understanding of Britain's wartime opera-
tions extremely difficult. 14 It is certain that London chose to keep certain
of its more dubious transactions under wraps and therefore away from
public examination-particularly hostile political scrutiny. Nurturing
the odious trade with large purchases of African slaves at a time of
mounting abolitionist sentiment would have been embarrassing, to say
the least. The British government's Army Extraordinaries account pro-
vided a place in which politically sensitive financial transactions could
be hidden. Army Extraordinaries contained large sums of money allo-
cated to cover extraordinary expenses that could not be foreseen and
which were in addition to sums voted by Parliament upon annual
estimates. The total amount, for instance, voted by Parliament for the
army for 1797, was £10,913,000 of which £4,300,000 was for Army
Extraordinaries. 15 The fact that this account lacked a periodic parlia-
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mentary audit resulted in massive fraud. The system of Army Extraor-
dinaries became so abused that it was eventually abolished in 1836. 16 It is
thought that virtually all costs associated with the raising of the West
India Regiments were met from funds drawn from this account. This
burial ground for dubious financial transactions was not the only place
where the accounts of slaves purchased on public account were
recorded. Fortunately, the details surrounding these transactions were
diligently recorded in official dispatches between army commanders in
the West Indies and the ministers, including Henry Dundas and William
Windham. Even George III was privy to the scheme. 17 These records
clearly show that from 1795 to 1808, the British government bought an
estimated 13,400 slaves for its West India Regiments at the considerable
cost of about £925,000. The average price paid per slave was approxi-
mately £70. 18 This was, apparently, substantially above that being paid
for new male slaves by civilian buyers. 19 It must be noted here that the
number 13,400 does not include an indefinite-but probably consid-
erable-number of additional slaves bought by the British government
to perform other military related functions, particularly those carried
out by the quartermaster general's department. It also does not reflect
slaves serving in the Royal Navy, nor slaves purchased in Portuguese
East Africa as recruits for Britain's Ceylon Regiments. British activities
in the Indian Ocean appear to duplicate those in the West Indies. 20
Recorded in one of these dispatches are the names of those commis-
sioned to provide slaves to the army from 1798-1807. This telltale list
even includes the names of two British army officers, the governor of
Dominica, Andrew Cochrane Johnstone, and the Commissary General
of the British army in the West Indies in 1807, one Samuel Chollet. 21 The
presence of the latter's name is a clear indication of conflict of interest as
it was the responsibility of the commissary general to award contracts to
prospective suppliers of slaves.
Based on Philip Curtin's slave trade calculations, and using 15,000 as
the average number of slaves imported into the British Caribbean from
1795 to 1808, total British imports reached about 195,000.22 The army's
purchases for the West India Regiments alone represented about 7
percent of this sum. Recent studies into the volume of Britain's slave
trade indicate that Curtin's census figures require upward revision. 23
This would require an increase in total British imports and a corre-
sponding decrease in the proportion of this revised estimate siphoned off
to maintain the black regiments. Nonetheless, the British government
was itself the largest individual buyer of slaves and, consequently, the
major promoter of the wretched trade.
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Procuring slaves was accomplished by contracting with merchants to
raise a specific number by a given date. One of the major contracts was
awarded to James Bontein of Martinique in 1797. Although brief, the
conditions of the Bontein contract were explicit and illuminating. Bon-
tein was engaged to provide the army with twenty-five hundred recruits
within four months of the date of agreement. The proper title to each
slave was to be warranted to the British government. No recruit was to
be younger than eighteen or older than thirty. The minimum height of
each recruit was five feet and all were to be of "a sound Body, and in all
points able to carry arms." Moreover, no recruit would be accepted by
the army who was "incumbered with a Family or Follower." All slave-
recruits were to be delivered to military depots at either Antigua, St.
Kitts, Barbados, Martinique, St. Vincent or Grenada, where they would
be inspected by officers and the medical staff and either accepted or
rejected. 24
A maximum of £70 sterling was to be paid in bills drawn by the
commissary general upon the Treasury for each approved slave. Bontein
was not permitted any contingent charges. However, he was given the
assistance of small recruiting parties from those West India Regiments
stationed at the various depots, and the allowance of six pence sterling
per diem in lieu of rations for each slave recruited from the date
purchased or attestation to the time when the slave was approved and
received by the army. Failing to fulfill these conditions, Bontein was to
forfeit a security of £5,000 sterling to the British government. 25
Instructions to inspectors and medical officers provide us with an
insight into some of the problems of purchasing slaves. The inspectors
were to be particularly attentive to the authenticity of the title of each
slave accepted by the army. To be genuine, each title had to be certified
by crown lawyers in those islands where the transactions occurred.
Furthermore, pertinent information pertaining to the identification of
the slave had to be registered with the office of the island secretary. No
slave was to be purchased as a recruit for British military service until
these conditions had been met.26
The age of the slave and the length of time he had lived in the West
Indies were additional problems. Sometimes these could be very difficult
to determine. The latter was of special importance because a seasoned,
fit slave, "a proper Subject for a Flank Company," would cost the
princely sum of £70 sterling. On the other hand, the price of a black
purchased directly from a slaver would range from only £50 to £56
sterling,27 Inspection teams resigned themselves to the fact that deter-
mining the age of a prospective slave-recruit was at best a troublesome
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task. Inspectors were warned to be "extremely exact" and to seek the
advice of knowledgeable persons. Ascertaining the length of time a slave
had resided in the West lndies was somewhat easier. The "principal
Proof' was whether or not the slave could speak and understand the
European language of the island from which he allegedly came. 28
The policy of purchasing slaves as soldiers was an important reason
for delaying abolition; it also helps explain Pitt's puzzling behavior.
First, however, what conclusions have historians come to on the issue of
delay? Three arguments, only partially explanatory, have been adduced:
(1) the unpopular linkage ofabolition with lacobinism and the influence
of the latter in causing the revolution in Haiti; (2) the threat of a
Haitian-style slave insurrection if British slavery were similarly mod-
ified; and (3) the necessity to continue the trade in order to harvest
Haiti's valuable sugar crop after that colony had been occupied by
Britain.29
The evident connection between abolition and lacobinism did indeed
prove temporarily detrimental to efforts to end the trade. At one point,
toward the end of 1792, the most vehement champions of abolition were
usually radical groups. But from about 1800 on, the revolutionary
excitement on the Continent waned and with it the antidemocratic spirit
in Britain. As for the lesson imputed to the upheaval in Haiti and other
slave societies elsewhere in the Caribbean, these events genuinely fright-
ened the proprietor class. In this climate of fear, many waxed eloquent
on the imagined dangers that would befall British colonies in the wake of
abolition. However, modification of the slave system in the Danish West
Indies in 1803 failed noticeably to unleash the anticipated violence.
Moreover, largely because of British military successes in the West
Indies from 1796 to 1798, a pronounced tranquility characterized the
once-turbulent sugar islands as the century came to an end.
The final argument, that the trade had to continue in order to main-
tain Haiti's sugar estates, is a plausible explanation of events up to 1798.
At the end of that year, faced with increasing expenditures and enor-
mous casualties in a losing cause, Britain abandoned its dream of
extended empire and evacuated the stricken island. As a result of the
Peace of Amiens of 1802, Britain returned all West Indian possessions
taken from France.
The destruction of Haiti did indeed open for the moment, however,
the way for a world sugar boom and a concomitant increased demand
for slaves which was being satisfied, even in the Spanish islands, by
British ships. Moreover, Britain's retention of Trinidad in 1802, with its
huge expanses of uncleared land, and planter designs on St. Vincent,
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which was opened up as a result of the wholesale deportation of dissi-
dent groups, certainly titilated British investors. The political conse-
quences of all this, plus the subsequent British reconquest of the rich
lands of the Dutch Guianas soon after the rupture of the Amiens Peace
in 1803, helped materially to delay the death of the British slave trade.
Still, more recent scholarship comes closer to the mark. As reasons
for the delay of abolition until 1807, it stresses royal hostility, the tardy
use of the argument that abolition would advance rather than hinder
traditional imperial and national interests, limitations of then-current
constitutional conventions, opposition in the House of Lords to reform
measures, and the absence of cabinet agreement which resulted in free
voting on the issue.
There are still gaps in the knowledge represented by these important
arguments, and in developing several of these further, Pitt's policy of
purchase sheds some additional light on the controversy.
As I have argued elsewhere, the obstacles to making abolition a
government measure were not limited to conventions of the Constitu-
tion, nor to the presence of powerful anti-abolitionists in successive
cabinets, particularly those headed by Pitt. Looking at the question of
cabinet consensus from a different angle, it appears that an agreement
had in fact been reached: not an official or public avowal but a privately
reached consensus; not one to support abolition, obviously, but concord
to oppose it! The chief abolitionists in the cabinet-Pitt, Grenville, and
Windham-and the leading opponents of abolition-Portland and
Dundas-had reached accord, probably as early as the end of 1795, to
use the slave trade to recruit the West India Regiments. This agreement
could also have been reached outside the cabinet by the principle parties.
According to J. Steven Watson, "Pitt often enough decided policy
outside the cabinet with Dundas or his cousin Grenville. In cabinet he
would then listen and reveal decisions."3o The decision satisfied the
immediate interests of all concerned: for those opposed to abolition, it
permitted the trade to continue and flourish; and to both abolitionists
and anti-abolitionists with responsibilities for directing the war, it
afforded an opportunity to prosecute the war successfully in the West
Indies and soon in other theatres of operations. Numerous official
correspondence confirm the participation of Portland, Dundas and
Windham in all stages of the development and implementation of the
policy of purchasing slaves as recruits for the British army. As head of
government, Pitt is compromised: it is inconceivable that a decision
such as this could have been reached and implemented without his
cognizance and approval.
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The actions and priorities of the abolitionists in cabinet are instructive
since they conflicted with those of the cause of abolition and thereby
doomed the movement to a protracted birth.
Windham, who had a long and close association with abolition and its
leaders, bolted from the movement soon after agreeing to serve under
Pitt as secretary of war, a post he held from 1794 to 180 I. As the
executive head of military administration at the War Office and answer-
able to Parliament on matters of military expenditure, Windham
assumed much of the responsibility for the inner workings and success
of Pitt's recruiting policy. Later, as secretary for war and colonies from
1806 to 1807, one of Windham's chief concerns was to provide the
soldiers, white and black, necessary for the war effort. From the start of
the war in 1793, the manpower needs of the regular army severely taxed
the talents and energies of successive ministers. Given the limitations
imposed by these imperatives, how could Windham simultaneously
fulfill the duties of his offices and champion the death of the trade that
provided the African troops so necessary to the protection of the empire
in both the West and East Indies?
What part did Lord Grenville play? Given his close personal and
political relationship with Pitt, it is reasonable to assume that he was
aware of and supported the policy of purchase. Indeed, as Colonial
Office records reveal, Grenville probably had the earliest and therefore
the longest association of any minister with the measure. In October
1790, as home secretary in Pitt's first administration, he authorized the
governor of Jamaica to purchase on public account the slaves needed to
service the British garrison on the island. However, Grenville's duties as
foreign secretary, beginning in 1791, made him the least ministerially
culpable for the execution of the African recruitment policy. For this
reason, his impact on the measure is more difficult to judge.
And what about Pitt? Enormous energies continue to be squandered
in an effort to exonerate Pitt of any major responsibility for the delay in
passing the Abolition ACt. 31 But delay he did, for the trade was the
mainstay of his policy of African recruitment. Within this context, then,
the reason for Pitt's "ambivalent," "dilatory," and generally perplexing
behavior becomes discernible. Two examples from this pattern of con-
duct illustrate the point. First, in 1796, Pitt failed to use privately his
considerable talents and extensive political influence to persuade
government supporters and others to vote for abolition and thereby
forestall a free vote on the motion. He was certainly not restrained from
lobbying on behalf of the motion by any political or constitutional
conventions, and he had done so before. But if he had, and been
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successful, he would have worked against his own war effort. Secondly,
in 1805, Pitt refused his official support of abolition at a time when the
chances of its becoming a government measure appeared excellent. But
,appearances were deceiving. How could abolition become a general
measure at a time~beginning in 1805 and continuing into l806~when
the number of Africans being purchased on public account was the
largest it had been in the entire operational life of the policy of purchase.
Total combined purchases for 1805 and 1806 were 2,792 slaves at a cost
of £207,708 sterling.32 By these and related actions Pitt demonstrated
clearly that his first priority was winning the war, not ending the slave
trade. Until some other exploitable source of African manpower was
discovered, abolition would have to be delayed.
On at least one occasion, Pitt was publicly confronted with his duplic-
ity: supporter of abolition and exploiter of the slave trade. During a
debate in Commons on 28 February 1805, on the bill for the abolition of
the trade, General Isaac Gascoyne, an opponent of abolition who,
ironically, became colonel of the 7th West India Regiment in 1805,33
disclosed the information that the government itself had contracted to
purchase five thousand slaves for military service. Although he recog-
nized the importance of having black regiments for service in the West
Indies, it appeared to Gascoyne from this action that it was permissible
to purchase slaves for military deployment but not for civil use. 34
Another speaker found this action of Pitt irreconcilable with the latter's
support of the abolition movement.35
Pitt's reply to these charges was brief, weak and specious. He had
heard of no such contract which his government had made for purchas-
ing slaves; nor could he believe that such a contract existed. He con-
fessed, however, that a contract of this type had been proposed to the
British government from an individual in the West Indies, but it had
been rejected immediately. The specious part of his reply then followed.
He claimed that his government had never conceived the idea of buying
slaves for its use. Instead, the plan was to purchase the "redemption" of
these slaves from a state of slavery. To Pitt this was totally different from
becoming a mere purchaser of human beings. 36
Pitt had been careful not to mention that his government had been in
the redemption-buying business since 1790. Pitt's retort that his
government had been purchasing only the redemption of slaves fooled
no one in Commons that day. This argument, born of Pitt's still creative
imagination, was nothing more than a feeble attempt by an embarrassed
man to avoid a humiliating situation. Stimulating the wretched trade
9
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with orders for thousands of slaves in order to save them from slavery
was hardly the way to bring the trade to an end.
Pitt may have been correct when he claimed that his government had
never contracted to purchase five thousand slaves from a single contrac-
tor. But, here, again, was yet another attempt of Pitt to move the
argument away from the central point, which was the evident duplicity
of his government (or at least of certain ministers) regarding the slave
trade, by quibbling about numbers and the purpose of buying people.
Finally, abolition of the trade became law in March 1807, with a
suddenness that surprised even some abolitionists.37 What factors pro-
duced this historic occasion? The coalition ministry that came to power
in 1806, and shepherded the abolition bill through Parliament contained
many who supported abolition. Other reasons included the improved
tactics and lobbying efforts of the abolitionists, as well as the political
leadership of Grenville. But to these factors must be added another:
abolition was no longer a threat to national or imperial security on
military grounds. The removal of the danger, therefore, ended the need
for the quiet agreement among abolitionists and anti-abolitionists in
cabinet. Abolitionists were now free to pursue their cause unencum-
bered. The elimination of the military argument weakened the oppo-
sition program by removing a major plank and may substantially
account for the rapid success ofabolition in 1806 and 1807. How did this
finally come about?
Actually, the revitalization of the abolition effort in 1804, prompted
considerable activity in London to find alternative sources of non-
European manpower for West Indian defense, and not without success.
The Mutiny Act of 1807, which was drafted under Windham's overall
direction, stipulated that blacks be enlisted for unlimited service only.
The Abolition Act, furthermore, decreed that forfeited slaves and slaves
taken as prizes of war could be enlisted into Britain's armed forces. And
to these was added an Order in Council of 16 March 1808, which
directed that all fit Africans taken from slavers be turned over to military
and naval authorities for enlistment into Britain's land and sea ser-
vices.38 Although it was no longer sanctioned in Britain, the trade would
continue to serve Britain's imperial interests.
Britain's use of the trade to maintain a slave army in the West Indies
was an important reason for the long delay associated with Abolition.
This policy also helps to explain Pitt's ambivalent attitude towards
Abolition since he was forced to encourage a trade he both personally
and publicly loathed.
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